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Driverless cars have made the jump from fantasy to the physical realm.
Technology has evolved to the point where autonomous cars will be a com-
mon sight in the very near future. The benefits of autonomous cars are plenti-
ful: increased safety for car passengers, who no longer have to fear drunk,
reckless, or distracted drivers, increased productivity for passengers who
can use the travel time to accomplish tasks, decreased reliance on fuel as the
cars often incorporate solar panels and automatically adjust speed to maxi-
mize fuel efficiency, and decreased traffic congestion as the cars can identify
upcoming trouble spots and take alternate routes to avoid delay. However,
this innovative technology brings with it an unaddressed legal issue: how
will legal liability be assessed when these cars collide with other cars,
pedestrians, or property? Current law surrounding liability for automobile
accidents largely bases liability on the actions of the driver. Similarly, look-
ing to the liability law governing computers does not address the issue either,
as the laws base liability on the actions of the operator of the computer
system, and the scant laws related to autonomous computer systems apply
only to commercial transactions. This article proposes that the solution to
this legal issue lies in treating autonomous cars like man's best friend, the
dog. Dogs and computers are both treated as chattel under tort law, and are
similar in that they can act independently, yet are considered property of
another. The laws governing canine ownership show that applying strict lia-
bility to autonomous car owners accomplishes the dual purpose of fairly as-
sessing liability without hampering the widespread adoption of this
marvelous technology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Decades ago, unmanned vehicles and driverless cars were only a dream
of a distant future.' If you look outside you might not see them, but autono-
mous cars are no longer a science fiction fantasy. Autonomous cars are cur-
rently developed and utilized around the world.2 In 2012, Nevada became the
first state in the United States to issue a license to operate a driverless car.3
Internet-giant Google uses autonomous "Street View" vans to take satellite
images of the surrounding environment for use in its Google Maps4 web
mapping service application and technology.5 Italy's VisLab, which has
spent the past two decades developing driverless vehicles,6 successfully sent
two driverless vans on an eight thousand mile test drive from Rome, Italy, to
Shanghai, China.7 Carmaker Audi sent its newly developed autonomous car
on the infamously challenging Pike's Peak Hillclimb race. 8
As autonomous cars become increasingly prevalent, the risk and likeli-
hood of collision with other vehicles rises.9 This poses a problem for
lawmakers, police, and insurance companies because current state laws con-
1. See Shrinivas Kirade, Driverless Car, BUZZLE, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/
driverless-car.html (last updated Sept. 28, 2011) (describing the driverless car
exhibited at the 1933 World Fair in Chicago, Illinois, in an exhibit by General
Motors called 'Futurama,' which depicted everyday life thirty years in the
future).
2. CNN Wire Staff, Google Gets License to Operate Driverless Cars in Nevada,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/07/tech/nevada-driveless-car (last updated
May 8, 2012).
3. Id.
4. See Google Maps/Earth Additional Terms of Service, GOOGLE http://www.
google.com/intl/en-us/help/terms-maps.html (last modified Mar. 1, 2012).
5. Sebastian Thrun, What We're Driving At, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Oct. 9,
2010, 12:00 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2010-
10-14TO9:43:00-07:00&max-results=10 (revealing that the Street View vans
used in California are autonomous).
6. All Things Considered: A Driverless Car Race From Rome to Shanghai, NPR
(July 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=128699
923 [hereinafter Driverless Car Race Recording].
7. About VIAC, VisLAB INTERCONTINENTAL AUTONOMOUS CHALLENGE, http://
viac.vislab.it/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (announcing that the two autonomous
vehicles completed the trip on Oct. 28, 2010).
8. David Williams, Audi's Driverless Car Goes Racing, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 1,
2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/6693453/Audis-driverless-
car-goes-racing.html (stating that the race consists of "13 twisting miles" on
Pikes Peak located near Colorado Springs, Colorado).
9. See Helen Popkin, Google Self-Driving Car Crash Caused by Human, NBC
NEws (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:22 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/google-
self-driving-car-crash-caused-human- 121531 (noting Google's autonomous car
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cerning automobile accident liability assume a human driver.O Since autono-
mous car technology is relatively new, and yet to be widely utilized, existing
laws do not directly address the determination of liability in a collision in-
volving an autonomous car." Although existing vehicle and computer laws
contain some legal tenants that can be applied to autonomous cars, they do
not provide courts with a comprehensive body of law to determine and assess
liability.12 However, a possible solution to this void might be to model laws
for autonomous cars after corollary laws for canine ownership. Examination
of canine ownership laws demonstrates that strict liability is a practical and
effective liability model that would similarly apply to autonomous car
owners.
Autonomous cars are a hybrid between vehicles and computers as they
are operated by a complex computer system consisting of cameras, laser sen-
sors, GPS software, and a multitude of other mechanisms that create a 3-D
image of the world around the vehicle.13 The computer system navigates the
vehicle through its environment without human involvement.14 For example,
the vehicle immediately stops moving when frontal sensors detect an obsta-
cle in the car's path, such as a pedestrian.15 The computer system also adjusts
the car's speed, gear, and route in response to road conditions, such as
potholes and changes in land slope, when detected by the sensors and cam-
drove over 160,000 miles without an accident and that the recent accident was
caused by a human when operating the car manually).
10. See, e.g., 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles § 112 (2010) (describing a person's
qualifications for licensing drivers of motor vehicles).
I1. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1321,
1322 (2012) (noting the potential problems with and unsettled nature of liabil-
ity for autonomous vehicles).
12. See generally id.
13. Driverless Car Race Recording, supra note 6; Italian Autonomous Car to Drive
from Italy to China, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (July 23, 2010), http://www.dw.de/ital-
ian-autonomous-car-to-drive-from-italy-to-china/a-5829135-1; see also Thrun,
supra note 5 (describing autonomous cars and the technology incorporated into
the vehicles).
14. See Thrun, supra note 5 (describing Street View vans that have no human
driver); Driverless Car Race Recording, supra note 6 (describing the vans as
"two, solar-powered, electric vehicles operating autonomously-that is, they
have no drivers").
15. Sylvia Marchetti, Italy's "Green," Driverless Cars on Modern "Silk Road" to
China, PHIL. NEWS AGENCY, (July 23, 2010), http://balita.ph/2010/07/23/italys-
green-driverless-cars-on-modern-silk-road-to-chinal (citing an incident where a
reporter in Milan, Italy, tested the vehicle's pedestrian sensors by launching
himself in front of the car, which halted immediately).
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eras on the vehicle.16 Upon input of a destination, a satellite-GPS program
directs the vehicle to its destination.17 Autonomous cars can, by definition,
literally drive themselves with little to no human interaction.
Their safety and efficiency could mean that the "family car" will soon
be autonomous. 18 However, autonomous cars also pose a grave risk to the
general public. Serious accidents could be caused by glitches, viruses, net-
work failures, and programming errors that commonly afflict computer-run
devices.19 This danger is very real; car manufacturer Toyota recently settled a
class action lawsuit stemming from personal injuries and property damages
caused by the malfunction of autonomous acceleration systems in certain
models that caused the cars to rapidly and uncontrollably accelerate and
crash.20 While these cars were not completely autonomous, these lawsuits
serve as a harbinger of the types of computer problems and injuries that can
occur with autonomous cars.
This article will discuss the current theories of assessing liability for
automobile accidents and computer use, and highlight how these bodies of
law contain some aspects that are applicable to autonomous cars but fail to
comprehensively address how to assess liability for a collision. Strict liability
laws governing canine ownership will be discussed, particularly how these
laws can serve as a model for developing law that addresses autonomous
vehicles. The discussion section will articulate why canine ownership liabil-
ity is a good model to utilize and will demonstrate how strict liability can be
successfully applied to autonomous car owners.
16. Id.
17. Vehicles Behavior, VisLAB INTERCONTINENTAL AUTONOMOUS CHALLENGE,
http://viac.vislab.it/?pageid=592 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (describing the
GPS "localization unit").
18. Susan Kuchkinskas, The Autonomous Car: The Road to Driverless Driving,
TELEMATICS MUNICH (May 30, 2013) http://analysis.telematicsupdate.com/
v2x-safety/autonomous-car-road-driverless-driving.
19. The scope of this paper will not discuss or focus on products liability claims
that may also arise against manufacturers, programmers, and retailers of these
autonomous cars.
20. Toyota Seeks to Dismiss Acceleration Lawsuits, CBS NEWS Nov. 19, 2010,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/toyota-seeks-to-dismiss-accelera-
tion-lawsuits/; see also Greg Risling, Toyota Settles Many Sudden-Acceleration
Lawsuits, USA TODAY Jan. 21, 2013, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/cars/driveon/2013/01/21/toyota-sudden-acceleration-lawsuits/
1851813/ (stating Toyota settled a class action suit regarding automatic acceler-
ation concerns in its vehicles but notes legal challenges are not over as Toyota
will likely still end up in court over the issue).
456 [Vol. XVI
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II. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LAW
While some states have passed legislation regulating the use of autono-
mous cars, these laws do not address liability concerns but merely licensing,
use, and regulation issues.21 Consequently, there is no body of law that di-
rectly addresses the liability for autonomous cars. This section provides an
overview of existing laws relating to automobile accidents and computer use.
This overview will illustrate that, while these areas may seem like the most
likely corollaries for dealing with autonomous cars, they are inadequate to
handle the full scope of autonomous car liability issues. After discussing cur-
rent automobile accident and computer use liability and the deficiencies in
these bodies of law in regards to autonomous cars, this section will investi-
gate canine ownership laws.
A. Automobile Accident Liability
There are three different situations for assessing automobile accident
liability: driver liability; runaway cars; and defective vehicles. Driver liabil-
ity is relatively straightforward and requires little explanation: driver is liable
for his own actions in causing an accident, such as negligent or reckless oper-
ation of the vehicle.22 Driving on the wrong side of the road, speeding, or
disobeying traffic signals can constitute negligent or reckless operation of a
vehicle.23 Many states have enacted statutes that impute the driver's liability
to the vehicle owner, if the vehicle's owner had granted permission.24 How-
ever, states will not typically impute a degree of liability greater than negli-
gence on the owner of a vehicle, regardless of the driver's liability.25 The
imputed liability statute purposely holds the vehicle owner accountable for
21. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2013) (setting forth California's law gov-
erning autonomous vehicle use).
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282 cmt. e, 283 cmt. e (1965)
(suggesting a defendant driver's duty includes protection from harm "normally
expected as a consequence of the negligent driving").
23. C.T. Drescher, Annotation, Custom or Practice of Drivers of Motor Vehicles as
Affecting Question of Negligence, 77 A.L.R. 2d. 1327 (1961).
24. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 485 cmt. d (1977) (stating
that in some jurisdictions, the vehicle owner is vicariously liable for the negli-
gence of the person operating the vehicle); see also DuBois v. Rose, 576
N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing methods of imputing a
driver's negligence to a vehicle owner); Ulrigg v. Jones, 907 P.2d 937, 940-41
(Mont. 1995) (discussing state statutes of imposing a driver's liability on the
vehicle owner).
25. See, e.g., Berry v. Kipf, 407 N.W.2d 648, 649 (Mich. 1987) (refusing to impute
the driver's intentional tort liability upon the vehicle owner); Gimenez v. Ris-
sen, 55 P.2d 292, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (same); White v. Center, 254 N.W.
90, 94 (Iowa 1934) (finding owner liable for negligence when the driver was
found reckless).
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ensuring a responsible driver operates the car26 and secures a financial re-
course for any injured party, presumably the vehicle owner.27
A small body of case law addresses runaway cars. A human driver does
not operate a runaway car, such as an empty car that rolls down a hill. In
runaway car cases, courts have based liability on the actions of the person
responsible for operating and maintaining the vehicle. In Czelzewicz v.
Turansky, the defendant was found negligent for failing to properly apply the
parking brake and liable for damage caused when the unoccupied vehicle
rolled down a hill and struck another vehicle.28 Some courts impute the oper-
ator's liability to the vehicle's owner the harm that the runaway car caused
could have been reasonably foreseen.29 In Allcity Insurance Co. v. Old
Greenwich Delicatessen, the court found that car wash attendants were negli-
gent by failing to control the vehicle as it rolled down a ramp unattended and
struck another vehicle. 30 The court then applied the state's imputed liability
statute and held the vehicle owner liable for the carwash attendants' negli-
gence because the vehicle owner could have expected that type of harm to
occur.3'
In Flood v. Travelers Village Garage, Inc., a New York court imposed
liability on a parking garage employee when he stopped a car on a sharp
incline, stepped out to open a gate, and the car rolled backwards down the
incline hitting the plaintiff.32 The court held that the employee was liable
because he failed to provide any "blockage against gravity;" such blockage
would be "to set the brake and turn off the ignition and turn the front wheels
26. Weber v. Pinyan, 70 P.2d 183, 185 (Cal. 1937) (". . . [T]he imputed negligence
act was designed to place upon the owner of a motor vehicle liability for inju-
ries in its operation by another with his permission, express or implied, and
thus hold the owner answerable for his failure to place the instrumentality in
proper hands . . . .").
27. Griffin v. La, 645 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("This [statute]
was enacted to ensure access by an injured party to a financially responsible
defendant . . . . An attempt by a vehicle owner to avoid all liability is . . . void
[against] . . . public policy.").
28. Czelzewicz v. Turansky, 258 A.2d 555, 557-58 (Conn. App. Cir. 1969)
("Upon the subordinate facts found, there was ample basis for a conclusion that
the defendant's conduct constituted negligence which was the proximate cause
of the collision.").
29. See generally, Allcity Ins. Co. v. Old Greenwich Delicatessen, 349 N.Y.S.2d
240, 242 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
30. Id. at 242 ("[T]he vehicle would not have run away had the car wash, through
its employees, kept it under control as they were duty-bound to do under the
laws of this state").
31. Id. (imputing liability to the vehicle's owner).




to the curb."33 The court also noted that liability was warranted because it
was reasonably foreseeable that the gearbox would fail and that gravity
would cause the car to roll backwards.34
If an accident is caused by a defect in the car, the owner may be held
liable.35 For instance, a gratuitous bailment occurs when a vehicle owner
loans the car to another driver without receiving a benefit.36 A vehicle owner
has a duty to disclose any known defects to foreseeable users and victims.37
Therefore, the vehicle owner is liable for harm caused by defects of which he
had "actual knowledge."38 This liability does not extend to defects the owner
should have discovered through reasonable inspection or "constructive
knowledge."39 If a car is so defective as to be uncontrollable, the courts may
determine that the car was a "dangerous instrumentality."40 In most jurisdic-
tions, if the court rules the car was a dangerous instrumentality, the owner's
liability is determined by the same "actual knowledge" standard as that of
33. Id. at 325.
34. See id. (imposing liability when precautions were not taken against reasonably
foreseeable mechanical car malfunctions).
35. See, e.g., Charles S. Parnell, Annotation, Liability of Bailor of Automotive Ve-
hicle or Machine for Personal Injury or Death Due to Defects Therein, 46
A.L.R. 2d 404 (1956) (stating that owners of vehicles lent to drivers are gener-
ally only liable for injury to the driver or third party if the owner knew at the
time of lending the vehicle that the vehicle had a defect and failed to disclose
the defect to the driver).
36. See, e.g., 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 99 (2009) (stating that generally, a gra-
tuitous bailor is not liable for injuries caused by defects if bailor has no actual
knowledge); but see Flaherty v. Helfont, 122 A.180, 181 (Me. 1923) (surmising
that an automobile may become a dangerous instrumentality even though the
defect was latent).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. g (1977) (stating that a vehicle
owner's duty is to exercise reasonable care to disclose information the owner
possesses); see also Pfeifer v. Canyon Constr. Co., 628 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (finding that a vehicle owner's actual knowledge can be estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence).
38. See Pfeifer, 628 N.E.2d at 720. For automobile collisions caused by unknown
defects, products liability will most likely be the predominant issue in the
litigation.
39. Dore v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 180 So. 2d 434, 436 (La. Ct. App.
1965) (declining to extend a vehicle owner's duty to include constructive
knowledge).
40. Collette v. Page, 114 A. 136, 137 (R.I. 1921) (finding that a car becomes a
dangerous instrumentality if the car becomes uncontrollable); Texas Co. v.
Veloz, 162 S.W. 377, 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (finding a car in a state of bad
repair can be found inherently dangerous).
2013] 459
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regular vehicles.41 In a minority of jurisdictions a higher standard of strict
liability is imposed for owners of dangerous instrumentalities.42 Strict liabil-
ity statutes are enacted to ensure that the owner is held accountable for the
safe use of his vehicle.43 In these jurisdictions, the owner is liable for the
damage in the automobile collision-even if the owner had no prior knowl-
edge of the defect.44
If an autonomous vehicle behaved erratically due to a virus or glitch, it
would inherently be "uncontrollable" since there is not a driver to control the
vehicle. Even with an emergency override switch, a person would have to be
present in the car in order to activate the switch. While California currently
requires a human passenger,45 it is not unconceivable to imagine that autono-
mous cars will eventually drive without human passengers. For example, if
an unoccupied autonomous car were driving to pick up a family member, the
override switch could not be activated in an emergency. An uncontrollable
car could, therefore, be considered a dangerous instrumentality and conse-
quently impose strict liability standards. However, since imposing strict lia-
bility for dangerous instrumentalities has only been adopted in a minority of
jurisdictions, state legislatures are not likely to embrace such a wide expan-
sion of this doctrine to encompass autonomous cars.46
An automobile owner may avoid liability if the victim was also liable in
causing the accident in some manner.47 In many jurisdictions, the plaintiffs
41. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 295 (2004) (discussing the reasonable care
standard applied to negligence cases involving dangerous instrumentalities);
see also Stewart v. Motts, 654 A.2d 535, 539 (Pa. 1995) (recognized only one
standard for care in actions involving dangerous instrumentalities, the standard
of reasonable care); Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 762 (Wyo. 1993)
(the standard is ordinary care in all circumstances, regardless of whether a dan-
gerous instrumentality is involved).
42. See, e.g., 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 295 (2004); Burch v. Sun St. Ford,
864 So.2d 466, 470, 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (imputing driver's liability
of intentional misconduct to owner of motorcycle via Florida's dangerous in-
strumentality doctrine); Friou v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 948 F.2d 972, 975 (5th
Cir. 1991) (applying Louisiana statute for imputing liability on owners of ob-
jects that cause unreasonable risk of injury).
43. See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000) (stating that a vehicle
owner is strictly liable for a driver's negligence if he voluntarily entrusts the
vehicle to be used by another).
44. See, e.g., Friou, 948 F.2d at 975 ("[Lliability is strict in that the custodian of
the thing is presumed to know 'of the risk presented by the thing under his
control.' ") (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. 2317).
45. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2013) (stating all autonomous cars must be
accompanied by a human driver); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.86 (West
2012); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482A.100 (West 2012).
46. See, e.g., 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 295 (2004).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. d (1977).
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recovery is barred by a successful showing of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk.48 Contributory negligence may be established when a vic-
tim intentionally or unreasonably exposed himself to a danger created by the
vehicle owner that the victim knew or should have known about, or other-
wise acted unreasonably.49 For example, contributory negligence can be
shown by jumping from a moving vehicle, suddenly stopping, or running into
the road.50 Assumption of risk is established by the victim voluntarily assum-
ing "a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant."51 An essential element of assumption of risk is implicit or ex-
plicit consent to undertake the risk by the victim.52
The current automobile accident laws are inadequate to address autono-
mous cars for several reasons. 53 Liability based on drivers and runaway cars
focuses on the actions of the person responsible for driving or operating the
car. An autonomous car would not have a human driver or operator, render-
ing these liability models inapplicable.54 The model for imposing liability for
defective vehicles is more easily applied to autonomous cars; however, this
48. Id. (explaining that recovery may be barred by either contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, or both). See generally Marchant & Lindor, supra note 11,
at 1336-37 (describing the assumption of risk defense and noting assumption
of risk defenses for autonomous cars would likely only extend to the owners
and users of the autonomous cars and not to the occupants of the other vehicle
for purposes of suing a manufacturer).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 (1977).
50. See id. § 466 cmt. c ("[T]he plaintiff must know of the physical condition cre-
ated by the defendant's negligence and must have knowledge of such facts that,
as a reasonable man, he should realize the danger involved. Furthermore, the
plaintiff must intentionally expose himself to this danger.").
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1977).
52. Id. § 496A cmt. c ("[A]ssumption of risk means that the plaintiff has given his
express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation to exercise care for his
protection, and agrees to take his chances as to injury from a known or possible
risk. The result is that the defendant, who would otherwise be under a duty to
exercise such care, is relieved of that responsibility, and is no longer under any
duty to protect the plaintiff . .. A second, and closely related, meaning is that
the plaintiff has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant
which he knows to involve the risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly
agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own
chances . .. Again the legal result is that the defendant is relieved of his duty to
the plaintiff.").
53. See generally Dana M. Mele, The Quasi-Autonomous Car as an Assistive De-
vice for Blind Drivers: Overcoming Liability and Regulatory Barriers, 28 SYR-
ACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 26, 41-47 (2013) (discussing the challenges of
introducing autonomous cars onto public roads with the current liability laws).
54. See generally id. at 27.
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model only addresses accidents that are caused by known defects.55 Only a
minority of jurisdictions that impose strict liability for dangerous instrumen-
talities apply liability for unknown defects.56 Additionally, accidents can be
caused by many factors that do not involve defects, such as poor road main-
tenance, weather conditions, and unpredictable behavior by other drivers,
pedestrians, and children. Accidents for autonomous cars could also be
caused by viruses, network outages, dropped satellite signals, and a variety of
problems caused by normal wear and tear. Current vehicle laws do not com-
prehensively address accident liability for autonomous cars.57
B. Computer Systems Law
Because autonomous cars rely largely on computer technology, it would
seem that the law governing computers may be relevant. However, upon ex-
amination, computer law contains certain aspects that relate to autonomous
cars, but fails to provide an adequately complete legal model for autonomous
car liability. The aspects of computer law that apply to autonomous cars ad-
dress the role of computers, liability for autonomous systems, and the use of
computers to inflict personal injury and property damage. However, while
autonomous cars will contain a computer, the car will be more than just a
computer and require a different view of liability.
The law does not recognize the computer as a legal entity, but instead
views it as the instrumentality of the person using it; the user is liable for
damage caused by the instrumentality even if that damage was unintended or
unanticipated.58 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bock-
horst, the court held that an insurance company must honor a policy that the
company's computer system erroneously reinstated, even though the policy
was ineligible by the company's standards.59 In McEvans v. Citibank, the
court held that an ATM created a bailment relationship between the bank and
the bank customer, holding Citibank responsible for a deposit that was lost
55. The scope of this paper will not discuss products liability claims for defective
vehicles that may arise against manufacturers, programmers, and retailers of
autonomous cars.
56. See, e.g., 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 295 (2004).
57. See generally Mele, supra note 53, at 28 (discussing newness of technology
and uncertainty regarding manufacturer liability).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (2006) ("[C]omputer pro-
grams are instrumentalities of the persons who use them . . . the legal conse-
quences for the person who uses it are no different than . . . any other ...
instrumentality."). But see Gabriel Hallevy, "I, Robot-1, Criminal"-When
Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI Robots Committing
Criminal Offenses, 22 SYRACUSE ScI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1 (discussing the
imposition of liability upon robots).




by the machine.60 Courts have found the users liable for the actions taken by
the instrumentalities, even though the users were not aware of and did not
intend those actions.61
A computer user can also be liable for the same types of damages that
commonly arise in an automobile collision: personal injury and property
damage. Personal injury, such as infliction of emotional distress, can be in-
flicted through the use of a computer. 62 In Stockdale v. Baba, the court found
a stalker who posted messages on an Internet message board frequented by
the victim could be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress.63
Similarly, in Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol, the
court found that police officers who posted pictures of automobile accidents
on the Internet could be found liable to the accident victims' family members
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.64
Property damage in computer cases typically consists of interference
with a person's use of their computer. 65 Courts have invoked the doctrine of
chattels to resolve these litigation issues.66 The doctrine of chattels holds that
owners are protected against harm caused to their chattel.67 Trespass to chat-
tels occurs when there has been intentional interference with the owner's
ability to use his chattel.68 Courts have invoked the concept of trespass to
60. McEvans v. Citibank, 408 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872-73 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
61. See id.; Bockhorst, 453 F.2d at 536-37.
62. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claims for Vicarious and Individual
Liability for Infliction of Emotional Distress Derived from Use of Internet and
Electronic Communications, 30 A.L.R. 6th 241 (2010) (discussing several
cases involving the use of computers to inflict emotional harm).
63. Stockdale v. Baba, 153 Ohio App. 3d 712, 2003-Ohio-4366, 795 N.E.2d 727,
48 (10th Dist.).
64. Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352,
394 (Ct. App. 2010).
65. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071-72
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding a creator of spyware liable for harm caused by inter-
fering with computer owners' use of their property, and noting that "[e]ven if,
as BE [the spammer] argues, its searches use only a small amount of eBay's
computer system capacity, BE has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to
use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes"); see generally
Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 428-35 (2002) (discussing several cases involv-
ing the use of computers to access corporate data).
66. See Quilter, supra, note 65, at 428-35 (discussing the application of trespass to
chattels to computers).
67. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217-18 (1977); see also
W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at
85-88 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1977).
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chattels in cases where computer owners were harmed by another user's
"trespass" upon their computer, resulting in interference with the owner's use
of his computer. 69 Additionally, courts found spam creators liable for trespass
to chattels for interfering with the email providers' servers. 70 In both personal
injury and property cases, courts have based liability upon the actions of the
persons who used the computers to cause harm.
Liability for autonomous systems has only been addressed in the limited
context of commercial transactions. The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws designed the Uniform Electronic Transac-
tions Act (UETA, or E-SIGN Act) to create a unified body of law to govern
the use of autonomous computer systems in business and government trans-
actions.71 A majority of states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands have adopted the UETA.72 The UETA discusses the liability
of the user of an autonomous system in commercial transactions involving
electronic records and systems. 73 The statute is typically invoked to bind par-
ties to commercial transactions using electronic signatures, or to enter online
agreements. 74 The UETA provides an example of a user being bound by an
electronic agent, whereby a computer user is legally bound to a contract by
69. See Quilter, supra, note 65, at 428-34 (discussing the application of trespass to
chattels to computers).
70. Compuserve v. Cyberpromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998). But
see Adam Mossoff, Spam: Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
625, 640-41 (summarizing the evolution of case law relating to spam and rec-
ognizing a shift in spam-related jurisprudence toward classifying the claims as
nuisance rather than trespass to chattels).
71. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note, 7A Pt. I U.L.A. 211, 213
(1999), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docslelectronic%20
transactions/uetafinal_99.pdf.
72. See Uni. Elect. Transactions Act, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/uniform-electronic-trans-
actions-acts.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (showing a table of jurisdictions
which have adopted the UETA. Illinois, New York and Washington, have not
adopted the UETA, but have similar statutes.).
73. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra note 71, § 14 (discussing the effect
of Automated Transactions on commercial transactions). "The Scope of this
Act is inherently limited by the fact that it only applies to transactions related to
business, commercial (including consumer) and governmental matters. Conse-
quently, transactions with no relation to business, commercial or governmental
transactions would not be subject to this Act." Id. § 3 cmt. 1.
74. See id. at Prefatory Note (identifying the applications of the JETA to elec-
tronic records, signatures, and contracts).
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clicking "I Agree" on a website, even if the user was not aware that a con-
tract was being formed.75
The UETA defines systems that operate without human operators as
"electronic agents."76 The UETA views electronic agents as a tool of the user
and states that the user can be legally bound by the tool's actions, even if the
user had no involvement in, or knowledge of, the transaction.77 In this way,
the UETA can be seen as an application of the instrumentality theory to com-
puters and computer users.78 However, the UETA is quite narrow. The
UETA is specifically limited to commercial transactions conducted using
electronic systems or documents,79 where both parties have agreed to the
transaction.80 The UETA also specifically notes that it proceeds on the as-
sumption that an electronic agent is functioning within the parameters of its
programming, and, in the event a system becomes fully autonomous and be-
gins to act independently, "courts may construe the definition of electronic
agent accordingly, in order to recognize such new capabilities."81 Therefore,
75. Id. § 14 cmt. 3 ("By clicking 'I agree' [the user] adopted a process with the
intent to 'sign,' i.e., bind herself to a legal obligation, the resulting record of the
transaction. If a "signed writing" were required under otherwise applicable law,
this transaction would be enforceable.").
76. Id. § 2 ("'Electronic agent' means a computer program or an electronic or
other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to
electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review or action
by an individual.").
77. Id. § 2 cmt. 5 ("An electronic agent, such as a computer program or other
automated means employed by a person, is a tool of that person. As a general
rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of
that tool since the tool has no independent volition of its own . . . . An elec-
tronic agent, by definition, is capable within the parameters of its program-
ming, of initiating, responding or interacting with other parties or their
electronic agents once it has been activated by a party, without further attention
of that party.").
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (2006) (describing the
instrumentality theory of computer programs).
79. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra note 71 § 3 cmt. I ("The Scope of this
Act is inherently limited by the fact that it only applies to transactions related to
business, commercial (including consumer) and governmental matters. Conse-
quently, transactions with no relation to business, commercial or governmental
transactions would not be subject to this Act.").
80. Id. at Prefatory Note (stating "recognition that the paradigm for the Act in-
volves two willing parties conducting a transaction electronically . . . the Act
only applies between parties that have agreed to conduct transactions
electronically").
81. Id. § 2 cmt. 5 ("While this Act proceeds on the paradigm that an electronic
agent is capable of performing only within the technical strictures of its preset
programming, it is conceivable that, within the useful life of this Act, electronic
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the UETA accepts that completely autonomous systems may arise; however,
it declines to extend its language to encompass these transactions as it stands.
Instead, the UETA invites courts to interpret the statute in light of these new
technological developments.
Certain notions of computer law could carry over to autonomous cars,
but existing laws do not address how liability would be assessed in an auto-
mobile collision. Computer law would suggest an autonomous car to be an
instrumentality of its owner; therefore, the owner will be liable for the acts of
the car-even acts unintended and unanticipated-much like the automated
systems in Bockhorst 82 and McEvans.83 The current methods to assess liabil-
ity for personal injury and property damage inflicted through the use of a
computer are inapplicable to autonomous cars because they rely on the ac-
tions of a human computer user, which would not exist in an autonomous car.
The UETA forays into applying the instrumentality doctrine to com-
puter systems acting without human involvement, but it is inapplicable to
autonomous cars in several ways. Primarily, the UETA is limited to commer-
cial transactions.84 Simply expanding the scope of the UETA to cover non-
commercial transactions is not beneficial because the statute is not compre-
hensive enough to be applied to automobile collisions. The UETA was de-
signed with purely economic consequences in mind.85 The UETA assumes
that parties have consensually entered into a commercial transaction and,
therefore, understand and accept the risks involved.86 A party entering into a
commercial transaction can anticipate and estimate potential damages by ex-
amining profit calculations, contract terms, pricing agreements, and defined
time periods. In contrast, the owner of an autonomous car cannot anticipate
the time, place, injuries, or property damage of an automobile collision. The
potential damage from any automobile collision is impossible to estimate
with any accuracy.
Additionally, the UETA proceeds on the assumption that a computer
system is functioning as it is programmed, and specifically declines to extend
its coverage to autonomous systems that can think, act, and change without
agents may be created with the ability to act autonomously, and not just
automatically.").
82. See Bockhort, 453 F.2d at 537.
83. See McEvans, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
84. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONs ACT, supra note 71 § 14 cmt. 1 (explaining that
"transactions with no relation to business, commercial or governmental transac-
tions would not be subject to this Act").
85. See id. at Prefatory Note.
86. See id. ("[R]ecognition that the paradigm for the Act involves two willing par-
ties conducting a transaction electronically . . . the Act only applies between
parties that have agreed to conduct transactions electronically.").
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human involvement87 The UETA clearly states that courts will need to inter-
pret the statute in different contexts to incorporate changes in technology,88
implying that the statute, as it stands, is not only inadequate to address auton-
omous systems, but it is not intended to do so. The UETA is important in a
legislative context because it demonstrates that lawmakers feel the user of an
autonomous system should be held liable for its actions, even if the user has
no involvement or knowledge of the action.
In summary, automobile liability could only be applied to autonomous
cars in the event that the collision was caused by a known defect89 or un-
known defect in a minority of jurisdictions.90 Computer law supports the no-
tion that the user of an autonomous car should be liable for the acts of the
car, but it does not provide direction for assessing this liability.91 Therefore,
accidents caused by other factors require a new body of law to be developed
that addresses the determination of liability for autonomous car owners.
C. Liability of Canine Owners
Canine ownership and liability laws provide a good model on which to
base laws governing autonomous cars because autonomous cars are highly
analogous to canines; both dogs and autonomous cars think and act indepen-
dently from their human owners, that may similarly inflict personal injury or
cause property damage.
87. Id. § 2 cmt. 5 ("While this Act proceeds on the paradigm that an electronic
agent is capable of performing only within the technical strictures of its preset
programming, it is conceivable that, within the useful life of this Act, electronic
agents may be created with the ability to act autonomously, and not just
automatically.").
88. Id. ("[T]hrough developments in artificial intelligence, a computer may be able
to 'learn through experience, modify the instructions in their own programs,
and even devise new instructions.' If such developments occur, courts may
construe the definition of electronic agent accordingly, in order to recognize
such new capabilities.") (citations omitted).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. g (1977) (stating that a vehi-
cle owner's duty is to exercise reasonable care to disclose information the
owner possesses); see also Pfeifer, 628 N.E.2d at 750 (finding that a vehicle
owner's actual knowledge can be established by circumstantial evidence).
90. See 57A Am. JUR. 2D Negligence § 295. See, e.g., Burch, 864 So. 2d at 470-72
(stating that Florida is the only state to adopt imputing driver's liability of
intentional misconduct to owner of motorcycle via Florida's dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine); see also Friou, 948 F.2d at 975 (applying Louisiana statute
for imputing liability on owners of objects that cause unreasonable risk of
injury).
91. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note II, at 1322.
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Animals, like computers, 92 are not legal persons, and cannot be held
personally liable for their actions.93 The doctrine of chattels is invoked-
similar to the way it is invoked for the use of computerS94-to hold animal
owners responsible for damage and injuries caused by their animals.95 Canine
owners can be liable for their dogs' acts96 in two ways: 1) strict liability
imposed by statute; 97 or 2) the common law "one bite rule."98 A canine
owner may avoid strict or common law liability if the victim acted in a way
that provides the canine owner with a defense against liability.99
Strict liability statutes for dog bites date back to the 1700s and were
enacted to ensure that the victim of a dog attack had financial recourse for
injuries caused by an aggressive dog.100 Concerned with the serious physical
danger that canine attacks pose, coupled with the millions of dog attacks per
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (2006) ("[C]omputer pro-
grams are instrumentalities of the persons who use them . . . the legal conse-
quences for the person who uses it are no different than . . . any other ...
instrumentality.").
93. Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296, 299-300 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that a dog is not
a legal personality).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217-18 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 67, § 14, at 85-88.
95. See, e.g.,KEETON ET. AL., supra note 67, § 14, at 85-88.
96. This section only addresses liability an animal owner faces when his animal
acts independently because this situation is most analogous to a driverless car
operating of its own volition. Animal owners may also be liable for their own
negligent acts, such as violation of leash laws and failure to adequately fence
their yards. See generally DOG BITE LAW, http://www.dogbitelaw.com (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013).
97. See generally Ward Miller, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule of Absolute or
Strict Liability for Dogbite, 51 A.L.R. 4th 446 (2010) (summarizing variations
in state statutes for strict liability for dog bites); see also Rebecca F. Wisch,
Quick Overview of Dog Bite Strict Liability Statutes, ANIMAL LAW (2012),
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/State%2OTables/tbusdogbite.htm (reporting
that 36 states have enacted strict liability statutes for canine owners).
98. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 518 cmts. g, h (1977) (stating
that an owner of animals has a duty of care to protect foreseeable persons from
the animal's dangerous propensities of which the owner knows or should
know).
99. See generally, Jay M. Zitter, Annotation Intentional Provocation, Contributory
or Comparative Negligence, or Assumption of Risk as Defense to Action for
Injury by Dog, 11 A.L.R. 5th 127 (2010) (summarizing defenses against dog
bite liability).
100. Kenneth Phillips, Statutory Strict Liability States, DOG BITE LAW, http://
dogbitelaw.comllegal-rights-of-dog-bite-victims-in-usalstatutory-strict-liabil-
ity-states.html [hereinafter Strict Liability States] (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
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year,o' an increasing number of courts and state legislatures have chosen to
discard the common law "one bite rule."102 Most states have now enacted
strict liability statutes, 0 3 which impose liability upon canine owners for inju-
ries caused by their dogs, without regard to the owner's negligence or prior
knowledge of the canine's aggressiveness.104 While no uniform statute exists,
states may impose strict liability for all types of injuries, rather than exclu-
sively for dog bites or severe injuries.105 Some states restrict the financial
liability of the canine owner to cover only medical expenses, while other
states allow claims for pain and suffering.106
Canine owners in states that do not have strict liability statutes are liable
under the common law "one bite rule," which makes canine owners liable for
their animals' dangerous acts only if the canine displayed prior signs of ag-
gression.107 The canine is allowed one bite, or prior act of aggression,108
before the canine owner is held liable for injuries sustained from an attack.09
The victim must show the owner knew (actual knowledge) or should have
known (constructive knowledge) their animal's tendency to harm others.II0
Constructive knowledge can be established when the owner could have rea-
sonably foreseen the injury based on the canine's past aggressive behaviors,
such as biting, snarling, snapping, or baring its teeth.",
101. Dog Bite Prevention, CDC, (Sept. 2013) (reporting 4.5 million dog bites per
year) http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/dog-bites/index.html.
102. Kenneth Phillips, Criticism of the One Bite Rule, DOG BITE LAW, http://
dogbitelaw.com/one-bite-rule/criticism-of-the-one-bite-rule.html [hereinafter
Criticism] (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
103. Wisch, supra note 97.
104. See Dougan v. Nunes, 645 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322-24 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding
canine owners strictly liable for plaintiffs injuries under New Jersey statute
N.J.S.A. 4:19-16); Pepper v. Triplet, 834 So. 2d 624, 630-31 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (applying Louisiana's strict liability statute for canine owners).
105. See Strict Liability States, supra note 100 (discussing variations among strict
liability statutes).
106. Id.
107. Kenneth Phillips, One Bite Rule Overview, DOG BITE LAW http://dogbitelaw.
com/one-bite-rule/overview-of-the-one-bite-rule.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2013).
108. See id. (noting that the term "one bite rule" is a misnomer because the rule
applies to any aggression, not just bites).
109. Criticism, supra note 102.
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 518 cmts. g, h, i (1977) (stating
that an owner of animals is liable for negligently failing to prevent the animal
from harming another); see also, Miller, supra note 97.
11. See Kenneth Phillips, The "Dangerous Propensity", DOG BITE LAW, http://
dogbitelaw.com/one-bite-rule/dangerous-propensity.html (discussing examples
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In State v. Powell, the court held a fatal attack on a jogger was reasona-
bly foreseeable by their owner because the dogs repeatedly escaped their
yard, were trained to be aggressive, and had growled at people passing on the
sidewalk.112 A minority of states follow the common law rule,113 and strict
liability jurisdictions may apply the common law rule if the canine owner
established a defense to liability or strict liability was inapplicable, such as if
the statute applied only to severe injuries and the victim's injury was rela-
tively minor.14 Damages in one-bite jurisdictions may be higher than strict
liability jurisdictions because punitive damages are permitted when the
owner knew or should have known of the dog's prior aggression.15
A canine owner can defend against liability in certain instances, even in
states that have strict liability. If the victim of a dog bite acted in a manner
that contributed to the dog attack, the canine owner may be absolved of lia-
bility.116 For example, trespassing on the canine owner's land,117 or provok-
ing by hittingis or taunting the animalil9 may allow the owner to avoid
liability. If the provoking act was unintentional, the canine owner is liable
only if the canine's reaction was disproportional to the provoking act. 120 In
Wade v. Rich, the court found that a child had unintentionally provoked a dog
by tripping over it, and the dog's reaction of repeatedly biting the victim
severely enough to require twenty-three stitches was disproportionate to the
of aggression that establish liability under the One Bite Rule) (last visited Oct.
20, 2013).
112. State v. Powell, 426 S.E.2d 91, 96 (N.C. App 1993) (finding that that construc-
tive knowledge was established).
113. See Wisch, supra note 97.
114. See Strict Liability States, supra note 100.
115. Id.
116. Zitter, supra note 99.
117. See Stroop v. Day, 896 P.2d 439, 443 (Mont. 1995) (finding that the victim was
not trespassing on the canine owner's land by resting his hands on the owner's
fence), overruled on other grounds by Giambra v. Kelsey, 162 P.3d 134 (Mont.
2006).
118. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Courtney, 277 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Neb. 1979) (finding that
a child provoked a dog by running at it, hitting it with a stick, and throwing dirt
or rocks at it).
119. See Reed v. Bowen, 503 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (stating
that the child's conduct of pulling on the dog and "bugging" the dog could
constitute provocation).
120. See Zitter, supra note 99.
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victim's unintentional act.12 The court found the canine owner liable under
the state statute for dog bite liability.122
Similarly, if a victim acted in a manner that would not normally provoke
an attack-passing a dog in the street-the canine owner is liable for the
victim's injuries. In Eigner v. Race, the court found the victim had not pro-
voked the dog attack by merely getting out of her car in front of the dog.123 In
Barr v. Groll, the court found a motorcyclist had not provoked a dog by
driving past as the dog crossed the street.124 This nuance is particularly im-
portant to note because passing a dog in the street is similar to a driver or
pedestrian sharing the road with an autonomous car. An autonomous car is
unlikely to be "provoked" in this sense, but a pedestrian or third party's ac-
tions could affect the autonomous car causing it to crash. Most importantly,
these defenses to strict liability show that the "victim's" actions can alleviate
or negate the burden of strict liability if the victim contributed to causing the
harm.
The growing trend of imposing strict liability upon canine owners
reveals that state legislatures, and presumably the citizens electing the repre-
sentatives, prefer strict liability to the common law "one bite rule." This body
of law demonstrates that the imposition of strict liability is an effective
method of assessing liability for autonomous creatures that can act without
control by their owners, such as dogs, and can be equally effective in assess-
ing liability for autonomous cars.
III. STRICT RECOMMENDATION
Automobile liability law addresses accidents caused by known defects.
Computer law defines an autonomous car as an instrumentality, showing
state legislatures would likely hold owners of autonomous cars accountable
for the acts of their systems. No laws, however, address the standard of lia-
bility for accidents with non-defect causes, such as poor weather conditions,
road maintenance, or third parties. An examination of liability for dogs-
another autonomous creature-shows that autonomous vehicle liability
should be strictly applied.
A. Justification
Canine ownership liability is a good model for developing laws for au-
tonomous cars for several reasons. Canines and autonomous cars are similar
121. Wade v. Rich, 618 N.E.2d 1314, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that the
viciousness of the dog's attack on the victim was "out of proportion to the
unintentional act committed by [the victim]").
122. Id. (stating that the dog's disproportionate reaction "clearly establishes the de-
fendants' liability for plaintiff's damages").
123. Eigner v. Race, 129 P.2d 444, 446 (Cal. Dist., Ct. App. 1942).
124. Barr v. Groll, 567 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ill App. Ct. 1991).
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in the purposes they serve and in the ways they act. Additionally, the justifi-
cations for imposing strict liability upon canine owners may similarly apply
to autonomous car owners.
The purposes that canines and autonomous cars serve in society are very
similar. Canines are domestic animals, which are an animal of a class "de-
voted to the service of mankind."25 A dog assists disabled persons, hunters,
and law enforcement, provides protection, and offers companionship. An au-
tonomous car, like most machines, is similarly "devoted to the service of
mankind" by providing transportation. In addition, both caninesl26 and com-
puters 27 are classified as chattel, and are autonomous in the sense that they
can "think," act, move, and cause damage or injury without any control or
involvement by their human owners. The chattel doctrine for canine owner-
ship bases liability on ownership, without regard to involvement by a per-
son.128 The doctrine of chattels could be similarly applied to autonomous
cars. For instance, the doctrine of chattels would apply to a canine owner that
takes his dog, which has never displayed any violent tendencies in the past,
for a walk outside where the dog then bites a person without provocation.
The doctrine of chattels should similarly apply to an empty autonomous vehi-
cle driving to pick up a family member from soccer practice that experiences
a system glitch to the car's sensors, and fail to recognize a pedestrian cross-
ing the street. In both situations, the doctrine of chattels holds the owner
liable for the injuries sustained by the victims.
The justifications for imposing strict liability upon canine owners are
equally applicable to autonomous cars. Strict liability statutes address the
danger that aggressive dogs pose to society. Millions of dog attacksl29 and
motor vehicle collisions3o occur every year. However, each year about thirty
fatal dog attacks occur,131 whereas automobile related fatalities exceed thirty
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 506(2) cmt. a (1977).
126. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 14, at 85-88.
127. See generally Mossoff, supra note 70, at 640 (stating significant case law es-
tablishing unauthorized access or spamming of another's computer as trespass
to chattels); Joseph D. Jean et al., Dusting Off an Old Law, RISK & INSURANCE
(Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyld=278946
672 (stating that trespass to chattels has been instituted to hold spammers ac-
countable for trespass against the victim's computer).
128. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217-18 (1977); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 67, § 14, at 85-88.
129. Home and Recreational Safety: Dog Bites, CDC (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.
cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/dog-bites/index.html.
130. NHTSA, DOT HS 811 162, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2008 DATA, 1 (2008),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811162.pdf (reporting approxi-
mately 6 million automobile accidents in 2008).
131. Investigative Reports of Dog Bite-Related Fatalities, NAT'L CANINE RESEARCH
COUNCIL, 2 (2011) http://nationalcanineresearchcouncil.com/uploaded-files/
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thousand annually.132 Although autonomous cars' increased safety features,
and the removal of human error, would decrease the fatalities and injuries
from automobile collisions, there still remains a significantly greater interest
in imposing strict liability upon owners of driverless vehicles because auto-
mobile deaths far exceed those of dog attacks.
Moreover, applying animal laws to automobile accident is not as strange
as it may initially sound. Many of the first cases surrounding automobiles
resulted from cars frightening horses.133 While there was significant discus-
sion as to whether strict liability should apply to car owners in frightened
horse cases, or generally to the operation of an automobile, courts determined
strict liability was not the appropriate standard.134
Furthermore, courts have grappled with the analogy of dogs and cars
before. In Lewis v. Amorous, the court stated, "It is not the ferocity of auto-
mobiles that is to be feared, but the ferocity of those who drive them ....
They are not to be classed with bad dogs, vicious bulls, and evil disposed
mules and the like."135 However, with the adoption of autonomous vehicles,
it will no longer be the driver that society should fear, but rather the vehicle.
As such, it is more appropriate to treat accidents involving autonomous vehi-
cles with a strict liability standard like "bad dogs, vicious bulls, and evil
disposed mules."136
B. Application of Strict Liability
Imposing strict liability upon autonomous car owners could seriously
deter consumer purchases and insurance company coverage due to the poten-
tial for costly damages. Enforcing strict liability for autonomous car owners
and shifting liability away from manufacturers could increase insurance pre-
miums for the individual car owners.137 Several factors, however, should de-
tinymce/2011%2OFinal%20Investigative%20DBRF%2OReport.pdf (reporting
thirty-one deaths in 2011 from dog bites).
132. NHTSA, supra note 130 (reporting 37,261 fatalities in 2008).
133. See Thompson v. Dodge, 60 N.W. 545, 545 (Minn. 1894).
134. See Torts-Liability Without Intent or Negligence-Operation of Defective Au-
tomobile, 34 HARv. L. REV. 564, 565 (1921) (considering whether strict liabil-
ity should apply to the operation of an automobile); see also Macomber v.
Nichols, 34 Mich. 212, 215-16 (1876) (refusing to hold that the operation of a
car requires strict liability and not reasonable care).
135. Lewis v. Amorous, 59 S.E. 338, 340 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).
136. See id.
137. See Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents
Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 101, 127
(forthcoming 2013) (arguing it would be beneficial to move liability away from
owners of autonomous vehicles by placing liability solely on the manufacturer
as that would lower insurance premiums); David G. Owen, Products Liability:
Principles of Justice for the 21st Century, 11 PACE L. REV. 63, 72 (1990) ("The
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fray increased insurance costs. For example, the increased safety of these
vehicles, relative to human-driven vehicles, reduces the chances of a colli-
sion and, subsequently, facing financial liability.138 Like canine ownership,
automatic car owners could also raise defenses that would allow them to
avoid strict liability. In addition, the societal benefits of these cars may out-
weigh the financial burden imposed by strict liability.
The application of strict liability seems like a heavy burden for the
owner to bear; however, it provides the best, and most comprehensive, sys-
tem for dealing with autonomous cars. Strict liability eliminates the problem
of determining how to assess liability without a human driver or operator.
Strict liability has been an appropriate choice for liability in areas tradition-
ally considered as highly dangerous, such as selling defective productsl39 or
demolition blasting.140 In Escolta v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Chief Justice
Traynor (then Justice Traynor), laid out justifications in his concurrence for
imposing strict liability on a bottle manufacturer-which are equally applica-
ble to owners of autonomous cars-when he stated, "public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health."1l Furthermore, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc., laid forth the basic purpose of enforcing strict liability.142 "The
purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries" are not borne
"by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."43 Strict
liability satisfies the same general principles when applied to the owner of an
autonomous car.
Additionally, enforcing strict liability on the vehicle's owner would also
help protect innovation and encourage manufacturers to push forward the
products liability system . . . does serve as a form of third-party insurance
mechanism, in which the manufacturer, at least theoretically, adds a component
to each product's price-as a kind of insurance premium-to reflect antici-
pated future payouts for liability claims.").
138. See Gurney, supra note 137 (noting that because human driver errors cause the
majority of automobile deaths, autonomous cars should decrease the number of
accidents and damage caused by the crashes).
139. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (discussing
strict liability for sellers and manufacturers of defective products).
140. See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea & Jill Gustafson, Annotation, 31A AM.
JUR. 2D Explosions and Explosives § 127 (2012) (discussing strict liability for
municipalities whose licensed residents store explosives that result in
explosions).
141. Escolta v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
142. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (setting
forth the policy reasons behind strict liability).




adoption of this technology. The benefits of autonomous vehicles will likely
reduce accidents, decrease traffic congestion, increase productivity, and in-
crease fuel efficiency.144 Unfortunately, traditional "tort law routinely penal-
izes innovation, while rewarding manufacturers who adhere to the status
quo."I45 In other words, courts prefer the devil they know over the one they
do not. 146 Often, this is because it is easier to focus on users, rather than
manufacturers, when adopting a new technology.147 Currently, car owners
bear the majority of accident costs, as they are often the cause of the acci-
dent.148 Shifting the costs away from the owner and to the manufacturersl49
would effectively stunt innovation and increase time to market. Holding the
user strictly liable would encourage innovation and decrease time to market
for autonomous cars, and in doing so, increase the benefits society could
receive from this new technology.
It is important to note that liability regarding automobiles is an evolving
doctrine. Today's lawsuits do not resemble the initial round of lawsuits
plaguing the industry.150 For example, courts applied strict liability for
ground damage caused by airplanes, blimps, and hot air balloons.'51 Strict
liability was favored because these ground damages emerged from new tech-
nologies that were viewed as hazardous.152 This strict liability standard for
144. See Gurney, supra note 137, at 104-05 (discussing the benefits of autonomous
vehicles).
145. Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and
its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1266 (2012).
146. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Man-
agement in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 307-08 (1985) (stating that
courts often "prefer natural, old, or established hazards to those deriving from
new technologies").
147. See Graham, supra note 145, at 1260-63 (describing the tendency to "blame
the user" during the early adoption period of a new technology).
148. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 11, at 1327 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
DOT HS 811 059, NHTSA: NAT'L MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SUR-
VEY, at 24-26 (2008)) (stating drivers are at fault in the majority of automobile
accidents).
149. See Cyrus Pinto, How Autonomous Vehicle Policy in California and Nevada
Addresses Technological and Non-Technological Liabilities, 5 INTERSECT, no.
1. 2012, at 6-8 (discussing how autonomous cars might shift the liability and
costs of accidents from owners to manufacturers).
150. See Graham, supra note 145 (noting how automobile litigation has changed
overtime).
151. See Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
152. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability Con-
cerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Ae-
rial Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 635 (2009) (discussing automated airplane
liability standards, specifically focusing on ground damage liability).
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ground damages was supported by the Restatement of Torts and remained
widely adopted, even after aviation safety improved.153 However, this stan-
dard has slowly begun to change. The Restatement (Third) of Torts declined
to take a position, and courts began to apply negligence standards rather than
strict liability to the aircraft owner.154 Consequently, courts can now apply
either a negligence or strict liability standard.
Strict liability standards allow courts to impose liability upon the vehi-
cle owner without determining the exact cause of an accident.155 This will be
especially helpful when dealing with cases involving autonomous cars be-
cause there may be no eyewitnesses to the car's actions leading up to the
accident.156 In addition, unexpected problems and issues will inevitably arise
with the use of new technology and equipment.157 Rather than sorting out
liability on a case-by-case basis, strict liability will enable courts to resolve
litigation quickly and efficiently.158 As time passes, any issues will become
more apparent and predictable, and the law can adapt its standard of liability
accordingly.
If courts choose to impose strict liability, insurance policies will help
defray the costs associated with autonomous car ownership. Both automobile
and canine owners commonly hold insurance policies to guard against the
financial risks that may arise from an automobile collision or dog attack.159
Once an imputed liability statute is applied to the owner of a vehicle, the
injured party receives the benefit of the owner's insurance.160 If the policy
153. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (1938).
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. k (2010); see also Crosby v.
Cox Aircraft Co. of Wash., 746 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1987) (holding negli-
gence might be better applied to ground damage caused by airplanes than the
strict liability standard for owners).
155. Economic Analysis of Alternative Standards of Liability in Accident Law,
BRIDGE, http://cyber.law.harvard.edulbridge/LawEconomics/neg-liab.htm
[hereinafter Standards of Liability] (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
156. See LeValley, Autonomous Vehicle Liability-Application of Common Carrier




158. Standards of Liability, supra note 155.
159. Dog Bite Claims Cost Insurers $497M in 2011, Insurance Group Says, CB-
SNEWS (May 17, 2012, 7:10 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-
57436026/ (discussing generally the large number of insurance claims by the
insured for recent dog bites).
160. Allcity Ins. Co. v. Old Greenwich Delicatessen, 349 N.Y.S. 2d 240, 243 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1973) (stating that imputed negligence statues extend the benefit of the




holder is liable for an accident or dog attack, the holder is financially respon-
sible for only a nominal deductible amount.161 The insurance provider is re-
sponsible for the remainder of any financial judgment.162 Accordingly, an
injured victim is able to recover financial damages regardless of the owner's
financial position. 163
Nearly every state in the United States requires vehicle owners to carry
a minimum amount of liability insurance on each vehicle.164 Importantly, au-
tomobile insurance policies cover the car itself.165 The insurance provider is
primarily responsible for financial remedies to parties injured by the vehicle,
so long as the driver of the vehicle was in some way liable for causing the
injury.166 Canine owners similarly insure against financial liability for dog
attacks. Homeowners insurance policies cover dog bite attacks that occur on
the owner's property, automobile insurance policies may cover dog attacks
that occur in the insured vehicle, and renters insurance policies may cover
attacks that occur in a rented property.167 While insurance providers have
increasingly removed dog bite liability from policies, particularly for "dan-
gerous breeds" such as Pit Bull Terriers and Rottweilers,168 dog owners can
161. See Insurance, LAwBRAIN, http://lawbrain.comlwiki/Insurance (last modified
Feb. 5, 2010) (discussing general automobile insurance system).
162. See id.
163. See Vehicle Entrepreneurship and Politics, A History of Automobile Insurance,
RANDOM HISTORY (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.randomhistory.com/1-50/022in-
surance.html (describing the history and evolution of insurance).
164. Philip Reed, How Much Car Insurance Do You Need?, EDMUNDS (May 26,
2009), http://www.edmunds.com/auto-insurance/how-much-car-insurance-do-
you-need.html (stating that fourty-nine states require minimum liability
insurance).
165. See Cameron Jones, Excluded Drivers: Who is Covered on My Auto Insurance
Policy and Who is Not?, AUTO INSURANCE Tips (July 28, 2009), http://www.
autoinsurancetips.com/excluded-drivers-covered-auto-insurance-policy-not
(stating that insurance follows the vehicle, not the driver).
166. See id. (stating that drivers with the owner's permission to operate the vehicle
are generally covered under the owner's insurance policy).
167. See Kenneth Phillips, Homeowner, Renter, and Other Insurance, DOG BITE
LAW, http://dogbitelaw.comlinsurance-for-dog-owner/homeowner-renter-other-
insurance.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (summarizing coverage types for
dog bites under various insurance policies).
168. See Kenneth Phillips, What to Do if You Cannot Insure Your Dog, DOG BITE
LAW, http://dogblitelaw.com/insurance-for-dog-owner/what-to-do-if-you-can-
not-insure-your-dog.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (discussing denial of in-
surance coverage for dangerous breeds).
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purchase supplemental insurance policies.169 Similar insurance options for
autonomous car owners could help defray the financial risks of strict liability.
Owners and insurance providers could potentially face sky-high costs if
courts impose strict liability on autonomous cars. However, the likelihood of
facing any liability is extremely low because of autonomous cars' novel
safety features.170 Additionally, insurance specifically designed for autono-
mous cars could be created, similar to elevator liability insurance.171 The car
can react to signals of pending collisions provided by motion detectors and
sensorsl 72 much faster than a human would be able to. This feature signifi-
cantly decreases the chance of a collision, which will result in lower insur-
ance costs and premiums. Insurance providers already offer discounts for
automated safety features, such as anti-theft devices, anti-collision systems,
anti-lock braking, and airbags.73 Additionally, the dangers of drunk driving,
distracted driving (talking or texting while driving), reckless or negligent
driving, road rage, and many other hazards caused by human drivers would
be eliminated.174 Lower risks would translate into lower costs for insurance
providers and lower insurance premiums for autonomous car owners.175
Owners of autonomous cars could raise similar defenses to those availa-
ble for vehicle owners and avoid strict liability in the same manner as canine
owners. A successful showing of contributory negligence or assumption of
risk by the injured party could invalidate strict liability for the autonomous
car owner.176 Regardless of eyewitness availability, cameras or other record-
ing equipment on the autonomous car could provide video or other electronic
evidence of the collision (akin to the "black box" flight recorded on
airplanes). 177
169. See id. (discussing the trend towards removing dog bite liability from insurance
policies).
170. See LeValley, supra note 156.
171. See id. (discussing elevator liability and the development of specific elevator
insurance).
172. Marchetti, supra note 15.
173. See generally Car Insurance Discounts, CAR INSURANCE COMPANIES, http://
www.carinsurancecompanies.com/car-insurance-discounts/ (last visited Oct.
27, 2013) (noting the types of discounts insurance companies provide for im-
proved car technologies).
174. See How are Insurance Rates Set?, PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE AGENTS, http://
www.pia.org/IRC/qs/qs-other/QS90360.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (dis-
cussing how auto insurance rates are formed through analysis of type of car and
driving record).
175. See id.
176. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 797 (2009).
177. What is a Black Box?, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC CHANNEL, http://natgeotv.com/
uk/air-crash-investigation/black-box (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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The potential societal benefits of autonomous cars are significant.178 For
instance, the hazards of negligent, reckless, drunk and distracted driving will
essentially be eliminated.179 Autonomous cars are capable of minimizing fuel
usage by adjusting speed to maximize efficiencyso and monitoring carbon
emissions.' 8' The cars could also communicate with each other to avoid and
reduce traffic congestion.182 Additionally, the cars could be partially powered
by solar panels.183 For many owners, the potential savings in time, fuel effi-
ciency, and the environmental benefits could outweigh the probability of
strict liability exposure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Autonomous cars will be a common sight on our roads in the near fu-
ture. Existing laws governing vehicles and computers do not provide the
proper means to assess liability for autonomous cars. These bodies of law
show the owner of an autonomous car will be held liable for the acts of the
car, but do not define the standard of liability to be applied. By examining
the laws governing canine ownership, strict liability seems to be a practical
and effective standard for autonomous cars. Furthermore, as states and gov-
ernment regulatory bodies begin to promote the autonomous car technol-
ogy,184 it is imperative to have a system of liability in place capable of
178. See LeValley, supra note 156.
179. NHTSA, supra note 130, at 1, 4, 7, 10 (reporting 37,261 auto accident fatali-
ties, 11,674 speeding related fatalities, 11,773 alcohol related fatalities, and that
55% of traffic fatalities in 2008 involved passengers not wearing seatbelts in
2008).
180. John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/sciencellOgoogle.html?-r=1&src=
twt&twt=nytimes (discussing the fuel efficiency capabilities of the vehicles).
181. Marchetti, supra note 15 (reporting that the cars send carbon usage reports to
team members) (available in cached form only).
182. Greg Hack, Driverless Cars Just Around the Corner, COMPLEx EvENT
PROCESSING & REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE (reposted on Aug. 10, 2010), http://
www.complexevents.com/2010/08/1 0/driverless-cars-just-around-the-corner
(theorizing that autonomous cars may be able to communicate with each other
to move in concert with maximum efficiency); David Williams, Audi's Driver-
less Car Goes Racing, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
motoring/news/6693453/Audis-driverless-car-goes-racing.html (stating that the
cars can help drivers reduce road congestion).
183. See Thrun, supra note 5.
184. See Angela Greiling Keane, Google's Self Driving Cars Get Boost from U.S.
Agency, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.connews/2013-
05-30/google-s-self-driving-cars-get-boost-from-u-s-agency.html (noting the
U.S. government is actively supporting autonomous car technology).
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handling the inevitable claims arising out of a shared roadway.185 Further-
more, setting forth a strict liability standard for autonomous vehicle owners
could further incentivize manufactures to push the adoption of autonomous
technology, expediting the vast benefits society will receive.
185. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 11, at 1337 (stating that while it is rare for
legislation to intervene to protect specific technologies, it is not unheard-of as
there have been specific protections set forth for the nuclear industry).
